Individual skill

supply-chain-attack-recon

External recon for software supply-chain attack surface — package-namespace squatting candidates, dependency-confusion vulnerabilities, GitHub Actions injection openings, container image registry exposure, SBOM mining, internal-package-name leakage, and CI/CD configuration exposure. Reconnaissance and identification ONLY — actual package publishing / typosquat attacks are EXTERNAL-OFFENSIVE and require explicit written sign-off because they can affect the entire npm/PyPI ecosystem. Use when the target has a public GitHub org, when their build artifacts/SBOMs are reachable, when their docker images are on Docker Hub/GHCR, or when you find internal package names in their JS bundles.

skills/supply-chain-attack-recon/SKILL.md

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Last checked
Nov 4, 2026

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1,011
Repository last updated
Nov 5, 2026
License
Apache-2.0

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## When to use

Trigger when:
- Target has a public GitHub organization (find via OSINT)
- JS bundles reference internal-looking package names (`@target-internal/...`, `target-utils`, `target-shared`)
- Build logs, SBOMs, or `package-lock.json` files are publicly accessible
- Target uses CI/CD that's partially public (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Bitrise)
- Docker images on Docker Hub/GHCR/Quay belong to target org
- Findings include `npmrc`/`pip.conf`/`gradle.properties` with internal registry URLs
- `.github/workflows/*.yml` files reference internal tooling

Do NOT use for:
- Internal-network artifact registries (out of scope per external boundary)
- Actually publishing typosquats / dep-confusion packages without explicit OK
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