Individual skill
hunt-ntlm-info
Hunt NTLM/Negotiate information disclosure on internet-reachable IIS/SharePoint/Exchange. Anonymous NTLM Type-2 challenge capture leaks NetBIOS domain, internal DNS forest, computer name, AD timestamp via AV_PAIRS structure. Default Windows-installer hostnames (WIN-XXXXXXXXXXX pattern) signal lazy provisioning. Use when target advertises `WWW-Authenticate: NTLM` or `Negotiate` headers anonymously.
knowledge/Claude-BugHunter/skills/hunt-ntlm-info/SKILL.md
Source commit 961a0dd3d2d2f66a07a416ade3b1d4473b64802e
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- Last checked
- Nov 4, 2026
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- 1,011
- Repository last updated
- Nov 5, 2026
- License
- Apache-2.0
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- ai-agent Repository topic
- appsec Repository topic
- bug-bounty Repository topic
- cybersecurity Repository topic
- devsecops Repository topic
- exploit-validation Repository topic
- hermes-agent Repository topic
- infosec Repository topic
- llm-security Repository topic
- nuclei Repository topic
- engineering Derived category
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## Crown Jewel Targets
NTLM info disclosure is a **Medium-severity finding when chained to context** — the leak itself is intentional protocol behavior (RFC-compliant NTLMSSP challenge), but on internet-exposed enterprise infrastructure it provides exact reconnaissance for the next stage of an attack. Highest-value targets:
- **Internet-reachable IIS / SharePoint / Exchange / OWA** with dual-auth (Forms + NTLM, or NTLM + Kerberos)
- **Citrix NetScaler / VMware Horizon View** internet-facing gateways with NTLM-backed AD auth
- **Lync / Skype for Business / Teams On-Prem** edge servers
- **WSUS / Windows Update Services** with NTLM-protected admin paths
- **CIFS-style fileshare proxies** (HCL Sametime, IBM Notes Domino) that proxy NTLM
- **Legacy SharePoint farms** that left NTLM enabled on the public-zone IIS binding
**What makes this pay:**
- Internal AD domain disclosure (parent-forest mapping, e.g. `customer.parent-corp.example` → tenant inside corporate-AD tree)
- Default-Windows-hostname disclosure (`WIN-XXXXXXXXXXX` pattern signals rushed provisioning → likely default service-account passwords)