Individual skill
azure-entra-cloud-pentesting
Azure and Entra ID offensive testing — tenant discovery via OpenID metadata, users, service principals, managed identities, application registrations, Microsoft Graph scopes and consent grants, RBAC across subscriptions, storage, Key Vault, App Service, Automation, and Run Command
internal/tools/skills/data/cloud-security/azure-entra-cloud-pentesting/SKILL.md
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- Last checked
- Nov 9, 2026
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- Nov 8, 2026
- License
- Apache-2.0
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- cybersecurity Repository topic
- security Repository topic
- bug-bounty Repository topic
- automation Repository topic
- autonomous-pentesting Repository topic
- ai-agent Repository topic
- ai-security Repository topic
- ethical-hacking Repository topic
- golang Repository topic
- penetration-testing Repository topic
- testing Derived category
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# Azure / Entra Cloud Pentesting
## Purpose
Full Azure + Entra ID offensive methodology: from a domain to a tenant model (black-box), or from a validated token/service principal (credentialed) to mapped identity, RBAC, resources, and escalation paths. Microsoft Graph and Azure CLI/API first — Sentinel/Defender are irrelevant to offensive workflow.
## Entry Conditions
- Black-box: a target domain, `azurewebsites.net`/`blob.core.windows.net` endpoints, or app client IDs from `cloud-attack-surface-discovery`
- Credentialed: ARM/Graph token, service-principal secret, or managed-identity token from `cloud-credential-abuse` (audience already decoded)
## Discovery Signals
- Tenant ID: `https://login.microsoftonline.com/<domain>/v2.0/.well-known/openid-configuration` (returns tenant ID for the domain)
- App/client IDs in JavaScript (MSAL configs, `clientId:`), redirect URIs revealing app registrations
- Azure-hosted hostnames (App Service, Functions, APIM, Front Door)
- Subscription/resource-group names in error messages, ARM URLs