Individual skill

detecting-mimikatz-execution-patterns

Detect Mimikatz execution through command-line patterns, LSASS access signatures, binary indicators, and in-memory detection of known modules.

internal/tools/skills/data/threat-hunting/detecting-mimikatz-execution-patterns/SKILL.md

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# Detecting Mimikatz Execution Patterns

## When to Use

- When proactively hunting for indicators of detecting mimikatz execution patterns in the environment
- After threat intelligence indicates active campaigns using these techniques
- During incident response to scope compromise related to these techniques
- When EDR or SIEM alerts trigger on related indicators
- During periodic security assessments and purple team exercises

## Detection Gaps & Validation

- **String/hash signatures are trivially evaded.** Renamed binaries, in-memory execution (Invoke-Mimikatz, reflective PE load, Cobalt Strike BOFs), and renamed module strings (`sekurlsa::logonpasswords`) defeat command-line and file-hash detection. Don't anchor on `mimikatz` keywords.
- **The durable signal is LSASS access.** Hunt Sysmon **EID 10** ProcessAccess targeting `lsass.exe` with `GrantedAccess` of `0x1010`, `0x1410`, `0x143a`, or `0x1fffff` from a non-system process. Verify EID 10 is enabled and lsass is not excluded in the Sysmon config — a common gap.
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