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exploiting-type-juggling-vulnerabilities

Exploit PHP type juggling vulnerabilities caused by loose comparison operators to bypass authentication, circumvent hash verification, and manipulate application logic through type coercion attacks.

internal/tools/skills/data/web-application-security/exploiting-type-juggling-vulnerabilities/SKILL.md

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# Exploiting Type Juggling Vulnerabilities

## When to Use
- When testing PHP web applications for authentication bypass vulnerabilities
- During assessment of password comparison and hash verification logic
- When testing applications using loose comparison (== instead of ===)
- During code review of PHP applications handling JSON or deserialized input
- When evaluating input validation that relies on type-dependent comparison

### How to CONFIRM a Hit (avoid false negatives)
- The positive signal is an **auth/compare actually bypassing**: the typed payload yields an authenticated session, a privileged response, or a "match" that the correct-but-wrong value does not. A 200 alone is not proof — diff against a known-bad baseline and require a real state change (session cookie, redirect to dashboard, role granted).
[Credential-related source omitted]
- For magic-hash collisions, confirm the stored hash is actually compared with `==`: a `0e[digits]`-only payload matches only if BOTH sides normalize to scientific-notation zero; test a known pair and a control that should fail.
- Do NOT conclude negative until you have tried ALL of these payloads/forms against EACH parameter:
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