Individual skill

exploiting-container-escapes

Escaping Docker/containerd containers to the host during authorized engagements via privileged-container abuse (host disk mount, capabilities, nsenter), sensitive host mounts (docker.sock, /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern, /proc/sysrq-trigger), the cgroup release_agent technique, and runc config.json bind-mount abuse.

internal/tools/skills/data/linux-hardening/exploiting-container-escapes/SKILL.md

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Nov 9, 2026
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Apache-2.0

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# Exploiting Container Escapes

## When to Use

- After gaining code execution inside a Docker, containerd, or CRI-O container during an authorized engagement
- When the container was started with `--privileged`, extra capabilities, or host namespaces
- When sensitive host paths or sockets are bind-mounted into the container
- When `runc`/`ctr` binaries or a Docker socket are reachable from inside
- During Kubernetes pod assessments where the pod's security context is weak

## Critical: Techniques Most Often Missed

Operators see "it's a container" and stop. Run the recon block first — one writable socket or proc path is usually a host shell.
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