Individual skill

hunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions

Hunt for adversary persistence through Windows Management Instrumentation event subscriptions by monitoring WMI consumer, filter, and binding creation events that execute malicious code triggered by system events.

internal/tools/skills/data/threat-hunting/hunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions/SKILL.md

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# Hunting for Persistence via WMI Subscriptions

## When to Use

- When proactively searching for fileless persistence mechanisms in Windows environments
- After threat intelligence reports indicate WMI-based persistence by APT groups (APT29, APT32, FIN8)
- When investigating systems where malware persists across reboots despite cleanup attempts
- During incident response when standard persistence locations (Run keys, scheduled tasks) are clean
- When WmiPrvSe.exe is observed spawning unexpected child processes

## Detection Gaps & Validation

- **Without Sysmon EID 19/20/21, you're relying on Event 5861 alone** — and 5861 logs permanent consumer creation but not all filter activity, so partial visibility produces false-negative "clean" results.
- **Payload lives in the consumer/filter properties (fileless):** an `ActiveScriptEventConsumer` carries the VBScript inline, so no child process appears until the trigger fires — process-only hunts miss dormant subscriptions.
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