Individual skill

analyzing-usb-device-connection-history

Investigate USB device connection history from Windows registry, event logs, and setupapi logs to track removable media usage and potential data exfiltration.

internal/tools/skills/data/digital-forensics/analyzing-usb-device-connection-history/SKILL.md

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# Analyzing USB Device Connection History

## When to Use
- When investigating potential data exfiltration via removable storage devices
- During insider threat investigations to track USB device usage
- For compliance audits verifying removable media policy enforcement
- When correlating USB connections with file access and copy events
- For establishing a timeline of device connections during an incident

## Detection Gaps & Validation

- **Most-missed artifacts:** USBSTOR alone is incomplete. Also parse the `USB\` key (VID/PID for non-mass-storage and MTP/PTP phones that USBSTOR omits), `MountedDevices`, per-user `MountPoints2`, `SYSTEM\...\DeviceClasses\{GUID}`, the SOFTWARE-hive `...\Windows Portable Devices\Devices` and `EMDMgmt` (volume serial + first/last timestamps), `setupapi.dev.log` (first insert), and `Microsoft-Windows-Partition%4Diagnostic.evtx` (capacity/serial, useful for sizing exfil).
- **First vs last connect, and per-user attribution:** the USBSTOR key LastWrite is only the *last* event for that device - get the *first* connection from `setupapi.dev.log` and per-session connects from DriverFrameworks-UserMode / Partition-Diagnostic event logs. A device in USBSTOR proves it touched the machine, not which user used it - tie it to a user via that user's `MountPoints2` volume GUID.
- **Anti-forensics that defeats this analysis:** registry keys and `setupapi.dev.log` can be deleted or the log rotated/truncated. Recover prior state from Volume Shadow Copies, `SYSTEM.LOG1/2` transaction logs, and RegBack. A wiped USBSTOR with surviving MountPoints2/EMDMgmt entries is itself an indicator.
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