Individual skill

implementing-memory-protection-with-dep-aslr

Implements memory protection mechanisms including DEP (Data Execution Prevention), ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization), CFG (Control Flow Guard), and other exploit mitigations to prevent memory corruption attacks. Use when hardening endpoints against buffer overflow exploits, ROP chains, and code injection. Activates for requests involving memory protection, exploit mitigation, DEP, ASLR, or CFG configuration.

internal/tools/skills/data/endpoint-security/implementing-memory-protection-with-dep-aslr/SKILL.md

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Nov 8, 2026
License
Apache-2.0

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# Implementing Memory Protection with DEP and ASLR

## When to Use

Use this skill when hardening endpoints against memory-based exploits by configuring DEP, ASLR, CFG, and Windows Exploit Protection system-wide and per-application mitigations.

## Common Misconfigurations & Verification

- **DEP left at OptIn:** the default `nx OptIn` only protects Windows components, leaving most apps unprotected. Confirm `bcdedit /enum {current}` shows `nx AlwaysOn` (or `OptOut` with a justified, documented exclusion list) — not `OptIn`.
- **Per-process ASLR opt-out:** an app shipping its own `.exe.config` or a registry `MitigationOptions` value under `Image File Execution Options` can disable ForceRelocateImages/BottomUp just for itself, silently reopening fixed-address ROP. Run `Get-ProcessMitigation -Name <app>.exe` and verify `ASLR.ForceRelocateImages` and `BottomUp` are `ON`, not `NOTSET`/`OFF`.
- **Mandatory ASLR needs both flags:** system-wide mandatory ASLR is only effective with BottomUp randomization enabled too; ForceRelocateImages alone leaves predictable layouts.
- **CFG assumed universal:** CFG only applies to binaries compiled with `/guard:cf`. `Get-ProcessMitigation -Name <app>.exe` may show CFG `ON` while the loaded module has no CFG metadata — it cannot be retrofitted, so legacy DLLs remain exploitable.
- **Verification:** `Get-ProcessMitigation -System` should report DEP, BottomUpASLR, HighEntropyASLR, SEHOP as ON; spot-check each hardened app with `Get-ProcessMitigation -Name <app>.exe` to confirm the deployed XML actually applied and wasn't overridden locally.

## Prerequisites
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