Individual skill

performing-cloud-forensics-investigation

Conduct forensic investigations in cloud environments by collecting and analyzing logs, snapshots, and metadata from AWS, Azure, and GCP services.

internal/tools/skills/data/digital-forensics/performing-cloud-forensics-investigation/SKILL.md

Read pinned source

Source commit d42f381ad34843e71a42658e5c57290c713e85af

What was checked

Matches the observed repository HEAD
Yes
Scanner rules are current
Yes
Repository scan complete
No
Skill scan complete
No
Observed behavior
Network or broad shell
Last checked
Nov 9, 2026

These are observations at the recorded commit, not a guarantee of safety. Review the source before running it.

Install this skill

Choose an agent in your Stack or copy a command below. Commands fetch the pinned commit and copy only this skill directory. Existing destinations are refused. Copying a command does not install anything.

An install command is unavailable: current rules, complete repository and skill scans, an eligible behavior level and a permitted license are required.

Repository context

Repository stars (not skill ratings)
1,317
Repository last updated
Nov 8, 2026
License
Apache-2.0

Observed agent integration: No specific integration evidence. Standard SKILL.md installation does not imply verified compatibility.

Files and excerpt

File metadata and permitted, redacted excerpts come from the recorded scan. Source links are pinned to that commit.

Browse files
Read excerpt

# Performing Cloud Forensics Investigation

## When to Use
- When investigating a security breach in AWS, Azure, or GCP cloud environments
- For collecting volatile and non-volatile evidence from cloud infrastructure
- When tracing unauthorized access through cloud service API logs
- During incident response requiring preservation of cloud-based evidence
- For analyzing compromised virtual machines, containers, or serverless functions

## Detection Gaps & Validation
- **CloudTrail may not capture what you need.** Management events are on by default, but **data events** (S3 object-level `GetObject`/`PutObject`, Lambda invokes) are **off** unless explicitly enabled — so silent bulk S3 exfil can leave no CloudTrail trace. Confirm which event categories and which regions were logging before scoping.
- **Logging can be disabled or expired.** Watch for `StopLogging`/`DeleteTrail` (AWS), diagnostic-setting removal (Azure), or sink deletion (GCP). Default `lookup-events` only reaches back ~90 days; older activity needs the S3/bucket archive. A coverage gap is itself a finding.
- **Global vs regional pitfalls:** IAM/STS and CloudFront log to **us-east-1**; multi-region attacks need per-region collection or you miss instance launches and key use elsewhere.
- **VPC Flow Logs / GuardDuty may not be enabled**, so network-level exfil evidence can be absent unless preconfigured.
Back to top