Individual skill
gcp-iam-privilege-escalation
GCP IAM privilege escalation - gcp service account impersonation primitives (actAs, getAccessToken, signBlob, signJwt), serviceAccountKeys, setIamPolicy at project/folder/org levels, custom role manipulation, — service account actAs, getAccessToken, signBlob and signJwt, serviceAccountKeys, setIamPolicy at project/folder/org levels, custom role manipulation, Cloud Build and Compute with stronger SAs, Functions and Cloud Run deployment abuse with inherited-role awareness
internal/tools/skills/data/cloud-security/gcp-iam-privilege-escalation/SKILL.md
Source commit d42f381ad34843e71a42658e5c57290c713e85af
What was checked
- Matches the observed repository HEAD
- Yes
- Scanner rules are current
- No
- Repository scan complete
- No
- Skill scan complete
- No
- Observed behavior
- Not checked yet
- Last checked
- Nov 7, 2026
These are observations at the recorded commit, not a guarantee of safety. Review the source before running it.
Install this skill
Choose an agent in your Stack or copy a command below. Commands fetch the pinned commit and copy only this skill directory. Existing destinations are refused. Copying a command does not install anything.
An install command is unavailable: current rules, complete repository and skill scans, an eligible behavior level and a permitted license are required.
Repository context
- Repository stars (not skill ratings)
- 1,313
- Repository last updated
- Nov 7, 2026
- License
- Apache-2.0
Observed agent integration: No specific integration evidence. Standard SKILL.md installation does not imply verified compatibility.
- cybersecurity Repository topic
- security Repository topic
- bug-bounty Repository topic
- automation Repository topic
- autonomous-pentesting Repository topic
- ai-agent Repository topic
- ai-security Repository topic
- ethical-hacking Repository topic
- golang Repository topic
- penetration-testing Repository topic
- devops Derived category
Files and excerpt
File metadata and permitted, redacted excerpts come from the recorded scan. Source links are pinned to that commit.
Browse files
Read excerpt
# GCP IAM Privilege Escalation
## Purpose
Prove GCP escalation from a starting principal to a higher-privilege identity or effective permission — typically service account impersonation (actAs / token mint / signBlob) or policy modification — with the previously unavailable action demonstrated. A broad role detected is never equivalent to successful escalation.
## Entry Conditions
- Validated GCP credential with an effective-permission map (`gcp-cloud-pentesting` steps 1–2)
- Runtime authorization for state-changing operations
## Attack Model
```text
starting identity
→ escalation primitive (actAs / token mint / policy set / deploy with SA)