Individual skill

detecting-wmi-persistence

Detect WMI event subscription persistence by analyzing Sysmon Event IDs 19, 20, and 21 for malicious EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding creation.

internal/tools/skills/data/threat-hunting/detecting-wmi-persistence/SKILL.md

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Last checked: Nov 9, 2026

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Repository stars (not skill ratings): 1,323
Repository last updated: Nov 8, 2026
License: Apache-2.0

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cybersecurity Repository topic
security Repository topic
bug-bounty Repository topic
automation Repository topic
autonomous-pentesting Repository topic
ai-agent Repository topic
ai-security Repository topic
ethical-hacking Repository topic
golang Repository topic
penetration-testing Repository topic
threat-hunting Declared skill tag
wmi Declared skill tag
persistence Declared skill tag
sysmon Declared skill tag
t1546.003 Declared skill tag
mitre-attack Declared skill tag
windows Declared skill tag
dfir Declared skill tag
security Derived category

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# Detecting WMI Persistence

## When to Use

- When hunting for WMI event subscription persistence (MITRE ATT&CK T1546.003)
- After detecting suspicious WMI activity in endpoint telemetry
- During incident response to identify attacker persistence mechanisms
- When Sysmon alerts trigger on Event IDs 19, 20, or 21
- During purple team exercises testing WMI-based persistence

## Detection Gaps & Validation

- **Sysmon 19/20/21 fire only on local `root\subscription`:** subscriptions in a different namespace, or `__EventConsumer` objects written remotely before Sysmon was deployed, generate no 19/20/21 — sweep WMI directly (`Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\subscription -Class __FilterToConsumerBinding`) to catch pre-existing ones.
- **MOF-based and remote creation:** `mofcomp.exe` compiling a malicious `.mof`, or remote `wmic /node:` subscription creation, may surface only as EID 1 (`mofcomp.exe`/`wmic.exe`) — confirm command-line auditing is on.