Individual skill

detecting-service-account-abuse

Detect abuse of service accounts through anomalous interactive logons, privilege escalation, lateral movement, and unauthorized access patterns.

internal/tools/skills/data/threat-hunting/detecting-service-account-abuse/SKILL.md

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# Detecting Service Account Abuse

## When to Use

- When proactively hunting for indicators of detecting service account abuse in the environment
- After threat intelligence indicates active campaigns using these techniques
- During incident response to scope compromise related to these techniques
- When EDR or SIEM alerts trigger on related indicators
- During periodic security assessments and purple team exercises

## Detection Gaps & Validation

- **Interactive logon is the signal:** service accounts should only show 4624 Type 5 (service) or Type 3 (network). Hunt 4624 **Type 2 (interactive)** and **Type 10 (RemoteInteractive/RDP)** for any `svc_*` account — but only if those logon types are collected (Type 10 needs RDP/TS auditing on the destination).
- **Kerberoasting precursor:** T1558.003 shows as 4769 TGS requests with `Ticket Encryption Type 0x17 (RC4)` for the service account's SPN — if 4769 auditing is disabled on DCs, the roasting is invisible.