Individual skill

detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk

Detect adversary lateral movement across networks using Splunk SPL queries against Windows authentication logs, SMB traffic, and remote service abuse.

internal/tools/skills/data/threat-hunting/detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk/SKILL.md

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# Detecting Lateral Movement with Splunk

## When to Use

- When hunting for adversary movement between compromised systems
- After detecting credential theft to trace subsequent lateral activity
- When investigating unusual authentication patterns across the network
- During incident response to scope the breadth of compromise
- When proactively hunting for TA0008 (Lateral Movement) techniques

## Detection Gaps & Validation

- **Coverage is the biggest gap.** 4624 Type 3/10 analysis only works if WEF collects from *all* endpoints, not just DCs. Most missed lateral movement is on member servers and workstations whose Security logs were never forwarded — verify ingestion per host class with `| tstats count by host`.
- **Pass-the-Hash uses cached creds, not 4648.** Over-relying on 4648 (explicit credential logon) misses PtH, which appears as 4624 Type 3 with `AuthenticationPackageName=NTLM` and `LogonProcessName=seclogo` against systems that should use Kerberos.