Individual skill
cloud-metadata-workload-identity
Cloud metadata and workload identity abuse — SSRF/file-read to AWS IMDSv1/IMDSv2, ECS task credentials, IRSA, Azure IMDS and Managed Identity, GCP metadata and GKE Workload Identity, chained to credentials, principal identification, permission enumeration, and privilege escalation
internal/tools/skills/data/cloud-security/cloud-metadata-workload-identity/SKILL.md
Source commit d42f381ad34843e71a42658e5c57290c713e85af
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- Last checked
- Nov 9, 2026
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- Repository last updated
- Nov 9, 2026
- License
- Apache-2.0
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- cybersecurity Repository topic
- security Repository topic
- bug-bounty Repository topic
- automation Repository topic
- autonomous-pentesting Repository topic
- ai-agent Repository topic
- ai-security Repository topic
- ethical-hacking Repository topic
- golang Repository topic
- penetration-testing Repository topic
- engineering Derived category
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# Cloud Metadata & Workload Identity
## Purpose
Turn any server-side request primitive (SSRF, code execution, file read, template injection) on a cloud-hosted workload into workload-identity credentials, then chain them into cloud control-plane access. "Metadata endpoint reachable" is never the stopping point.
## Entry Conditions
- A server-side primitive on a cloud-hosted target: SSRF, LFI/command-line file read, RCE, or header-controlled fetch
- No cloud credentials yet (this is the classic black-box → credentialed transition)
## Discovery Signals
- Target fingerprinted to a cloud provider (`cloud-attack-surface-discovery`)
- SSRF that can reach link-local addresses (169.254.169.254, 169.254.170.2, metadata.google.internal)
- Container/lambda/instance-like behavior (long-running processes, periodic tasks, upload pipelines)
- Error messages leaking `AWS_`/`AZURE_`/`GOOGLE_` environment variable names