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analyzing-linux-system-artifacts

Examine Linux system artifacts including auth logs, cron jobs, shell history, and system configuration to uncover evidence of compromise or unauthorized activity.

internal/tools/skills/data/digital-forensics/analyzing-linux-system-artifacts/SKILL.md

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# Analyzing Linux System Artifacts

## When to Use
- When investigating a compromised Linux server or workstation
- For identifying persistence mechanisms (cron, systemd, SSH keys)
- When tracing user activity through shell history and authentication logs
- During incident response to determine the scope of a Linux-based breach
- For detecting rootkits, backdoors, and unauthorized modifications

## Detection Gaps & Validation

- **Most-missed artifacts:** beyond `auth.log`/`.bash_history`, collect `/var/log/journal/` (binary systemd logs that survive when text logs are rotated/deleted), `wtmp`+`btmp`+`lastlog`, `/etc/systemd/system/*` and user `~/.config/systemd/user/` timers, `/etc/cron.*` and `at` jobs, every `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, `/etc/ld.so.preload`, and `/var/log/audit/audit.log`. Persistence increasingly hides in systemd timers and `.service` units, not crontab.
- **Anti-forensics that defeats this analysis:** `.bash_history` is trivially cleared (`history -c`, `unset HISTFILE`, `ln -s /dev/null ~/.bash_history`) - a missing or gapped history is itself an indicator, not "no activity." Cross-check against `auditd` execve records, journald, and `last`/wtmp. Timestamps can be `touch`-stomped; compare against inode change time (`stat` ctime), which user tools cannot set directly.
- **Cleared/rotated logs:** a truncated or missing `auth.log`/`secure` is suspicious - recover prior entries from journald, rotated `.gz` archives, or unallocated space, and look for the `logrotate`/`wtmp` gap that brackets the intrusion.
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