Individual skill

detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks

Detect DLL side-loading attacks where adversaries place malicious DLLs alongside legitimate applications to hijack execution flow for defense evasion.

internal/tools/skills/data/threat-hunting/detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks/SKILL.md

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# Detecting DLL Sideloading Attacks

## When to Use

- When investigating potential DLL hijacking in enterprise environments
- After EDR alerts on unsigned DLLs loaded by signed applications
- When hunting for APT persistence using legitimate application wrappers
- During incident response to identify trojanized applications
- When threat intel indicates DLL sideloading campaigns targeting specific software

## Detection Gaps & Validation

- **EID 7 is often filtered off.** Sysmon Image Load logging is high-volume and many configs (even SwiftOnSecurity) exclude common signers or whole processes. Confirm ImageLoaded is enabled and your target host process is not in an exclude rule, or you'll never see the sideload.
- **"Signed" is not "trusted."** Attackers sign DLLs or abuse signed-then-appended code, so `SignatureStatus=Valid` alone is meaningless. Check that the signer is the expected vendor and compare the cert thumbprint and module hash to a known-good baseline.