Individual skill

detecting-pass-the-hash-attacks

Detect Pass-the-Hash attacks by analyzing NTLM authentication patterns, identifying Type 3 logons with NTLM where Kerberos is expected, and correlating with credential dumping.

internal/tools/skills/data/threat-hunting/detecting-pass-the-hash-attacks/SKILL.md

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# Detecting Pass The Hash Attacks

## When to Use

- When proactively hunting for indicators of detecting pass the hash attacks in the environment
- After threat intelligence indicates active campaigns using these techniques
- During incident response to scope compromise related to these techniques
- When EDR or SIEM alerts trigger on related indicators
- During periodic security assessments and purple team exercises

## Detection Gaps & Validation

- **NTLM logging is the blind spot:** PtH surfaces as Security EID 4624 Type 3 with `Authentication Package = NTLM` and `Logon Process = NtLmSsp` on a host/account that normally uses Kerberos. If NTLM auditing (`Restrict NTLM: Audit NTLM authentication`) and DC EID 4776 are not enabled, the hash use is invisible — confirm both are on.
- **Local-account hashes (RID 500) skip DC logs:** lateral movement with a local admin hash only logs on the destination, not the DC. Hunt 4624 Type 3 where `TargetUserName` is a local account and `LogonGuid` is all-zero (no Kerberos TGT was ever requested).
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