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detecting-supply-chain-attacks-in-ci-cd

Scans GitHub Actions workflows and CI/CD pipeline configurations for supply chain attack vectors including unpinned actions, script injection via expressions, dependency confusion, and secrets exposure. Uses PyGithub and YAML parsing for automated audit. Use when hardening CI/CD pipelines or investigating compromised build systems.

internal/tools/skills/data/security-operations/detecting-supply-chain-attacks-in-ci-cd/SKILL.md

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Nov 8, 2026
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# Detecting Supply Chain Attacks in CI/CD


## When to Use

- When investigating security incidents that require detecting supply chain attacks in ci cd
- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques

## Detection Gaps & Validation

- **SHA-pinning checks miss tag-pinning illusions:** flagging `@main`/`@v3` is right, but a `@v3` *tag* (or even a short SHA) is mutable/forgeable — only a full 40-char commit SHA is immutable. Also a pinned action can still pull unpinned transitive actions or `docker://image:latest` inside itself; recurse into reusable workflows (`uses: org/repo/.github/workflows/x.yml@ref`) and Dockerfile `FROM` lines.
- **Script-injection detection is broader than `github.event`:** untrusted input also flows through `github.head_ref`, `github.event.pull_request.title/body`, `github.event.issue.*`, and `env:` derived from them. Match the whole untrusted-context set in `run:` blocks, not just `github.event`.
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