Individual skill

analyzing-prefetch-files-for-execution-history

Parse Windows Prefetch files to determine program execution history including run counts, timestamps, and referenced files for forensic investigation.

internal/tools/skills/data/digital-forensics/analyzing-prefetch-files-for-execution-history/SKILL.md

Read pinned source

Source commit d42f381ad34843e71a42658e5c57290c713e85af

What was checked

Matches the observed repository HEAD
Yes
Scanner rules are current
Yes
Repository scan complete
No
Skill scan complete
No
Observed behavior
Network or broad shell
Last checked
Nov 9, 2026

These are observations at the recorded commit, not a guarantee of safety. Review the source before running it.

Install this skill

Choose an agent in your Stack or copy a command below. Commands fetch the pinned commit and copy only this skill directory. Existing destinations are refused. Copying a command does not install anything.

An install command is unavailable: current rules, complete repository and skill scans, an eligible behavior level and a permitted license are required.

Repository context

Repository stars (not skill ratings)
1,329
Repository last updated
Nov 9, 2026
License
Apache-2.0

Observed agent integration: No specific integration evidence. Standard SKILL.md installation does not imply verified compatibility.

Files and excerpt

File metadata and permitted, redacted excerpts come from the recorded scan. Source links are pinned to that commit.

Browse files
Read excerpt

# Analyzing Prefetch Files for Execution History

## When to Use
- When determining which programs were executed on a Windows system and when
- During malware investigations to confirm execution of suspicious binaries
- For establishing a timeline of application usage during an incident
- When correlating program execution with other forensic artifacts
- To identify anti-forensic tools or unauthorized software that was run

## Detection Gaps & Validation

- **Prefetch disabled or absent != no execution:** Prefetch is off by default on Windows Server, and on SSD systems `EnablePrefetcher` is often set to 0. An empty or sparse `C:\Windows\Prefetch\` does not mean nothing ran - confirm the policy at `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management\PrefetchParameters` before concluding "no execution," then pivot to Amcache/ShimCache/SRUM/Event Logs.
- **Most-missed details inside the .pf:** parse the up-to-8 last-run timestamps (not just the most recent), the run count, and the referenced-file list (loaded DLLs, opened data files). The embedded path hash matters: a hash that doesn't match the on-disk path means the binary ran from a different location (USB, deleted folder) than where it now sits.
- **Anti-forensics that defeats this analysis:** attackers delete individual `.pf` files or clear the folder - a present executable with no Prefetch, or a folder with fewer files than an active system accumulates, is itself suspicious. Recover deleted `.pf` from `$MFT`/unallocated and Volume Shadow Copies, and corroborate the gap with USN delete events.
Back to top