Individual skill

hunting-for-registry-persistence-mechanisms

Hunt for registry-based persistence mechanisms including Run keys, Winlogon modifications, IFEO injection, and COM hijacking in Windows environments.

internal/tools/skills/data/threat-hunting/hunting-for-registry-persistence-mechanisms/SKILL.md

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# Hunting For Registry Persistence Mechanisms

## When to Use

- When proactively hunting for indicators of hunting for registry persistence mechanisms in the environment
- After threat intelligence indicates active campaigns using these techniques
- During incident response to scope compromise related to these techniques
- When EDR or SIEM alerts trigger on related indicators
- During periodic security assessments and purple team exercises

## Detection Gaps & Validation

- **Key coverage blind spots:** Run vs RunOnce vs RunOnceEx vs `Winlogon\Shell`/`Userinit` vs IFEO (`Image File Execution Options\<exe>\Debugger`, `GlobalFlag`+`SilentProcessExit`) vs COM hijack (`HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{...}\InprocServer32`). Sysmon EID 13 fires only for paths in your RegistryEvent filter — default configs routinely miss IFEO and per-user `Classes`, the #1 false-negative.
- **Hive scope:** logged-off users' HKCU lives in unmounted NTUSER.DAT, so live `reg query` misses it — hunt offline hives too.
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