Individual skill

hunt-session

Hunt Session Management vulnerabilities — session fixation (no regeneration on login), insufficient invalidation on logout / password-change / email-change, predictable or low-entropy session IDs, JWT-as-session with no exp/revocation, refresh-token rotation/reuse-detection gaps, OAuth/SSO session linkage, device-bound-session (DBSC) downgrade, and cookie attribute issues (Secure/HttpOnly/SameSite/__Host-). Validate with TWO real sessions (attacker A + victim B), body-diff every 200, and OOB confirmation for theft chains. Medium to Critical (fixation→admin hijack, no-invalidation→persistent ATO).

redteam/hunt-session/SKILL.md

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Nov 9, 2026

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Nov 7, 2026
License
MIT

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# HUNT-SESSION — Session Management

## Crown Jewel Targets

Session fixation leading to admin hijack = Critical. Session surviving a password change = High-to-Critical (persistent ATO from a stolen cookie that the victim believes they revoked by resetting their password).

**Highest-value chains:**
- **Session fixation** — server accepts a session ID set by the client and does NOT regenerate it on login → attacker pre-plants an ID, victim authenticates, attacker rides the now-authenticated session → persistent ATO.
- **No invalidation on logout** — old token still works after `/logout` → theft window never closes.
- **No invalidation on password / email change** — a stolen session survives the victim's "I think I was hacked, let me reset" → persistent ATO. This is the single highest-paid session bug class.
- **Refresh-token reuse without rotation-detection** — a leaked refresh token mints fresh access tokens forever; no reuse-detection means the legitimate user's later refresh does NOT revoke the attacker's branch.
- **Predictable / low-entropy session ID** — sequential, timestamp- or userId-derived IDs → brute-force or compute other users' sessions.
- **JWT-as-session with no `exp` / no revocation list** — stolen JWT = permanent access; logout is cosmetic.
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