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investigating-aws-incidents

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Investigate security incidents in Amazon Web Services -- reconstruct attacker activity from CloudTrail, VPC Flow Logs, and GuardDuty, anchor the investigation on the compromised principal (access key or role), trace privilege escalation and persistence through IAM API calls, detect data exfiltration and crypto-mining, and contain without destroying evidence or tipping off the attacker. Use when responding to a suspected AWS compromise, exposed access keys, anomalous CloudTrail activity, a GuardDuty finding, unexpected IAM changes, crypto-mining EC2 instances, or S3 data exfiltration.

secskills-defense/skills/investigating-aws-incidents/SKILL.md

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Sep 4, 2026
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# Investigating AWS Incidents

In AWS an incident is reconstructed from logs the attacker usually could not
delete -- CloudTrail, VPC Flow Logs, and the control plane's own record of every
API call. The investigation is therefore a log-correlation exercise anchored on
the compromised principal: the access key or assumed role, and the sequence of
API calls it made. Find the principal, pull every event it generated, and the
rest of the intrusion falls out of the timeline.

## When to Use

- Exposed or leaked AWS access keys -- committed to a repo, in a pastebin, or flagged by AWS abuse
- Anomalous CloudTrail activity -- API calls from unfamiliar regions, IPs, or user agents
- A GuardDuty finding -- credential exfiltration, tor traffic, crypto-mining, or anomalous IAM behavior
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