Individual skill
attacking-serverless
Attack serverless compute — AWS Lambda, Azure Functions, GCP Cloud Functions, and edge runtimes like Cloudflare Workers. Enumerate functions, inject through event sources (S3, SQS, SNS, API Gateway, EventBridge), extract credentials from the execution environment, abuse over-privileged IAM roles, exploit cold-start persistence and container reuse, and test trigger misconfigurations. Use when a target runs serverless functions, when API Gateway or function URLs front compute, when event-driven architectures process untrusted input, or when cloud function execution roles need privilege-escalation testing.
secskills-offense/skills/attacking-serverless/SKILL.md
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- Last checked
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- License
- MIT
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# Attacking Serverless
Serverless changes the attack surface from hosts to events. There is no SSH, no
persistent shell, no OS to enumerate in the traditional sense. The execution
environment is ephemeral, but the IAM role attached to it is not, and that role
is almost always the real target. A compromised Lambda function does not give you
a server — it gives you a set of AWS credentials that refresh automatically,
have no MFA, and were scoped by a developer who optimized for "make it work"
rather than least privilege. The same pattern holds across Azure Functions, GCP
Cloud Functions, and edge runtimes, with minor variation in where the credentials
live and how the isolation boundary is drawn.
## When to Use