Individual skill

attacking-entra-id

Attack and enumerate Azure AD / Entra ID tenants — initial recon with AADInternals and ROADtools, password spraying, token theft (PRT, CAE, refresh tokens), application and service principal abuse, Conditional Access bypass, cross-tenant pivoting, hybrid identity attacks (PTA agent, Azure AD Connect), and managed identity abuse. Use when pentesting Entra ID tenants, assessing Azure AD security posture, or exploiting cloud identity misconfigurations.

secskills-offense/skills/attacking-entra-id/SKILL.md

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Sep 4, 2026
License
MIT

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# Attacking Entra ID

Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) is the identity control plane for Microsoft 365,
Azure, and thousands of SaaS integrations. Compromising it grants access to
everything those identities protect: mailboxes, SharePoint, Azure
subscriptions, and any application that trusts the tenant. Despite this, Entra
ID environments are routinely less monitored than on-premises Active Directory.
Most organizations lack equivalent detection coverage for cloud identity
attacks, and the attack surface -- OAuth tokens, application consent, service
principals, Conditional Access gaps -- is fundamentally different from
traditional AD.

Only against tenants you are authorized to test.
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