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escaping-hardened-containers

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Escape containers that drop capabilities, enforce seccomp profiles, and run behind AppArmor or SELinux — enumerating residual capabilities, analyzing seccomp filters, abusing single-capability escapes, cgroup release agents, filesystem mounts, and runtime CVEs. Use when a container has no --privileged flag but retains exploitable capabilities, when seccomp or LSM blocks standard escape paths, when targeting gVisor or Kata sandboxes, or when reviewing a hardened container deployment for residual attack surface.

secskills-offense/skills/escaping-hardened-containers/SKILL.md

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Nov 11, 2026

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Sep 4, 2026
License
MIT

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# Escaping Hardened Containers

Most container escapes documented online assume `--privileged`. The work
starts when the container IS hardened -- seccomp is on, capabilities are
dropped, and the obvious paths are blocked. The remaining attack surface
is smaller but not zero, and single capabilities or filesystem mounts are
often enough.

Only against systems you are authorized to test.

## When to Use

- The container is not privileged but retains one or more interesting capabilities (CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH, CAP_NET_RAW)
- A seccomp profile is active and blocks common escape syscalls -- you need to map what is still allowed
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