Individual skill
attacking-saml
Attack SAML single sign-on by decoding and tampering with signed XML assertions — XML signature wrapping (XSW1-XSW8), signature stripping, assertion and attribute tampering, NameID comment injection, XXE through the SAML parser, certificate faking, recipient confusion and IdP-initiated replay, and Golden SAML forgery. Use when a request carries a `SAMLRequest` or `SAMLResponse` parameter, when base64+deflate decodes to XML with `<saml:Assertion>`, when the target exposes a `/saml/acs` or `/sso` endpoint, when an IdP-initiated login lands an assertion at the SP, or when federation runs through Okta, ADFS, Ping, or Azure/Entra.
secskills-offense/skills/attacking-saml/SKILL.md
Source commit ca53957bcd8e3b83b5d4d190bb3ad008a4f15c84
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- Matches the observed repository HEAD
- Yes
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- Observed behavior
- Local scripts
- Last checked
- Nov 11, 2026
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- 188
- Repository last updated
- Sep 4, 2026
- License
- MIT
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- security Repository topic
- skills Repository topic
- engineering Derived category
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# Attacking SAML
SAML security is XML signature validation, and XML signatures are notoriously
hard to validate correctly. The assertion is signed — but which element is
signed, what the XML parser reads, and what the application ultimately trusts
can be three entirely different things. That gap is XML Signature Wrapping,
and it is the reason SAML breaks far more often than its cryptography suggests.
Only against systems you are authorized to test.
## When to Use
- A request or redirect carries a `SAMLRequest` or `SAMLResponse` parameter
- Base64 (plus DEFLATE for the redirect binding) decodes to XML containing