Individual skill

threat-model-stride

Applies STRIDE threat modeling to a feature or system design and produces a prioritized threat table with concrete mitigations ranked by exploitability and impact. Use when someone asks "threat model this feature", "what could go wrong with this design", "is this integration safe to build", or is reviewing auth flows, new data stores, webhook receivers, file uploads, or external integrations before the code is written. Do NOT use for prioritizing scanner or pentest findings on already-shipped code - use vulnerability-triage instead; for line-by-line security review of written code, use secure-code-review.

skills/threat-model-stride/SKILL.md

Read pinned source

Source commit 97a13607d669157a4a16d5ba79b77f208319f7b9

What was checked

Matches the observed repository HEAD: Yes
Scanner rules are current: No
Repository scan complete: No
Skill scan complete: Yes
Observed behavior: Not checked yet
Last checked: Nov 6, 2026

These are observations at the recorded commit, not a guarantee of safety. Review the source before running it.

Install this skill

Choose an agent in your Stack or copy a command below. Commands fetch the pinned commit and copy only this skill directory. Existing destinations are refused. Copying a command does not install anything.

An install command is unavailable: current rules, complete repository and skill scans, an eligible behavior level and a permitted license are required.

Repository context

Repository stars (not skill ratings): 24
Repository last updated: Oct 13, 2026
License: MIT

Observed agent integration: No specific integration evidence. Standard SKILL.md installation does not imply verified compatibility.

claude Repository topic
claude-skills Repository topic
skill-me Repository topic
security Derived category
design Derived category
data Derived category

Files and excerpt

File metadata and permitted, redacted excerpts come from the recorded scan. Source links are pinned to that commit.

Browse files

SKILL.mdcore · 8,177 bytes

Read excerpt


# Threat Model STRIDE

A threat found at design review costs a paragraph in a doc; the same threat found in production costs an incident, a credential rotation, and sometimes a disclosure. STRIDE catches whole classes of flaws - spoofed callers, tamperable payloads, privilege leaks - before there is code to review. Apply it to any feature touching auth, data storage, external calls, or privilege changes; skip it and the same flaws surface later in secure-code-review or, worse, in vulnerability-triage.

## Operating procedure

Follow the steps in order. Threats enumerated before trust boundaries are explicit come out vague and unactionable, and mitigations written before scoring waste effort on Low findings.

### Step 1: Gather inputs

Collect these before modeling. Where the user cannot answer, use the default and label the assumption a guess.

- Feature description in 3-5 sentences: what it does, who calls it, what it stores.
- Actors: users, internal services, external APIs, admin roles. Default: anonymous internet user, authenticated user, one backend service.