Individual skill

secrets-hygiene

Guides detection, emergency rotation, and prevention of leaked secrets and credentials across source code, git history, CI pipelines, logs, and infrastructure config. Use when someone says "I think I committed an API key", "a secret leaked", "scan the repo for credentials", "how should we store secrets", or is setting up secrets management for an application, CI/CD, or Kubernetes. Do NOT use for detecting or redacting personal data like names, emails, or SSNs - use pii-scrubber instead; for routine non-secret environment configuration on Vercel, use vercel-env-management.

skills/secrets-hygiene/SKILL.md

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# Secrets Hygiene

A leaked secret is a live incident until rotated. Treat any suspected exposure as confirmed until proven otherwise - the cost of an unnecessary rotation is always lower than the cost of a breach. The costly mistake this skill prevents is the instinctive wrong move: deleting the commit, force-pushing, and considering it handled while the key stays valid in every fork, clone, and scraper cache.

## Operating procedure

The order is deliberate: rotation comes before investigation because every minute of analysis is a minute the credential works for an attacker.

### Step 1: Gather inputs

- What leaked (or might have): credential type, issuing system (cloud console, API portal, identity provider), and the privilege it carries.
- Where and when: repo and commit, CI log, chat message, Docker image; how long it has been exposed. If unknown, assume the worst plausible window and label it a guess.
- Whether the repo is public, has forks, or has ever been public.
- Who can execute the rotation and whether a rotation runbook exists for this credential.
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