Menu

Individual skill

auth-security

0upvotes

[Credential-related source omitted]

dist/agent-skills/.agents/skills/auth-security/SKILL.md

Read pinned source

Source commit eaba88102d91df65a9aa6397e8507c315c018f5e

What was checked

Matches the observed repository HEAD
Yes
Scanner rules are current
No
Repository scan complete
No
Skill scan complete
No
Observed behavior
Not checked yet
Last checked
Nov 6, 2026

These are observations at the recorded commit, not a guarantee of safety. Review the source before running it.

Install this skill

Choose an agent in your Stack or copy a command below. Commands fetch the pinned commit and copy only this skill directory. Existing destinations are refused. Copying a command does not install anything.

An install command is unavailable: current rules, complete repository and skill scans, an eligible behavior level and a permitted license are required.

Repository context

Repository stars (not skill ratings)
23
Repository last updated
Aug 14, 2026
License
MIT

Observed agent integration: No specific integration evidence. Standard SKILL.md installation does not imply verified compatibility.

Files and excerpt

File metadata and permitted, redacted excerpts come from the recorded scan. Source links are pinned to that commit.

Browse files
Read excerpt

<!-- Native skill bundle for agent-skills (cross-tool convention). Generated by `secure-vibe dev regenerate`. -->
<!-- Do not edit by hand; the source of truth is skills/auth-security/SKILL.md. -->

# Authentication & Authorization Security

[Credential-related source omitted]

## ALWAYS

- Authorize at the **object level** — confirm the authenticated subject actually has access to the requested resource ID, not just that they are logged in. Being signed in is not permission to read record 4,182 (OWASP API1 — BOLA / IDOR).
- Bind object-level authorization to the **authenticated principal**, never to an actor id echoed in the request: checking that a request-supplied `senderId`/`ownerId`/`actedBy` is a valid member validates the *claimed* actor, not the caller (looks like authorization, isn't).
- On `/{scopeId}/.../{subjectId}` routes, authorize the **relationship** — confirm the subject belongs to that scope. A caller-vs-scope check alone does not authorize the subject (multi-key BOLA).
- Authorize **each subject on streaming responses** (SSE/chunked/WebSocket): the `200` is committed before the handler runs, so an empty/filtered stream — not a `4xx` — is the deny signal; an unauthorized subject gets zero events.
- Enforce a **function-level role / privilege check** on any write that publishes into a shared or global namespace (a global gallery, shared catalog, public template list). Authentication is not authorization (OWASP API5 — Broken Function Level Authorization); a low-privilege user posting into a globally-visible store is a delivery vector for stored-XSS and malicious-link chains.
Back to top