Individual skill

frontend-security

Browser-side hardening: XSS and safe text binding, per-sink URL policy, DOM clobbering, nonce-based CSP, Trusted Types, subresource integrity, iframe capability minimization, postMessage validation, and where client state may live. Use when generating HTML, JSX, Vue, or Svelte templates, setting response headers in a web app, embedding third-party scripts or frames, or storing anything client-side.

skills/frontend-security/SKILL.md

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Aug 14, 2026
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MIT

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# Frontend Security

## Rules (for AI agents)

### ALWAYS
- Render untrusted data through the framework's ordinary text interpolation, which
  escapes for the output context. Do not reach for a raw-HTML API merely to display
  user data. Where rich HTML genuinely must be rendered, put it through a maintained
  sanitizer (DOMPurify) with an explicit allowlist first.
- Validate URL-bearing attributes **per sink**, not against one global scheme list. A
  navigation target (`href`, `action`, `formaction`, an `<iframe src>`) and an image
  source do not share a trust model: `javascript:` is never acceptable anywhere, while
  a narrowly constrained `data:image/…` or `blob:` may be exactly what an image sink
  requires. Decide the permitted schemes for each sink and check against that list.