Individual skill

deserialization-security

Block unsafe deserialization and unsafe XML parsing in Java, Python, .NET, PHP, and Ruby: gadget chains, unrestricted type resolution, external entity expansion, and safer formats. Use when parsing or deserializing data from an untrusted source, wiring cookies, sessions, queues, or RPC payloads, or reviewing pickle, unserialize, Marshal, ObjectInputStream, BinaryFormatter, or XML parser configuration.

skills/deserialization-security/SKILL.md

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# Deserialization Security

## Rules (for AI agents)

### ALWAYS
- Prefer data-only serialization formats — JSON, Protobuf, MessagePack with an
  explicit type map — over formats that reconstruct arbitrary runtime objects. What
  makes a format safe here is not schema validation; it is whether the parser can
  instantiate a class the payload names.
- Constrain polymorphic type resolution to an explicit set of expected application
  types. Never let payload data choose the runtime class — that is the mechanism
  behind every gadget chain, whichever serializer is involved.
- Treat an object-reconstructing deserializer crossing a trust boundary as high risk:
  `pickle`, `ObjectInputStream`, `BinaryFormatter`, `unserialize`, `Marshal.load` and