Individual skill

electron-security

Harden Electron: renderer trust boundary (nodeIntegration, contextIsolation, sandbox), build-time fuses, contextBridge and IPC allowlists, shell.openExternal, navigation guards, deep-link auth, safeStorage. Use when generating main-process code, a preload script, or custom-protocol handlers, when packaging a release, or when storing tokens in an Electron app.

skills/electron-security/SKILL.md

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Last checked: Nov 6, 2026

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Repository stars (not skill ratings): 23
Repository last updated: Aug 14, 2026
License: MIT

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claude-skills Repository topic
llm Repository topic
security Repository topic
skills Repository topic
operations Derived category

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SKILL.mdcore · 10,641 bytes
SKILL.mdcore · 10,641 bytes
checklists/electron_hardening.yamlasset · 2,827 bytes
references/electron-hardening.mddoc · 4,627 bytes
references/verifying-findings.mddoc · 4,345 bytes
tests/corpus.jsonasset · 4,393 bytes

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# Electron Desktop Security

## Rules (for AI agents)

### ALWAYS
- **Treat the renderer as untrusted.** Any renderer-side code execution — XSS in
  rendered content, a redirect, a deep link — must not be able to reach Node, the
  shell, the filesystem, or session tokens. Every other rule here follows from this
  one, and every IPC sink you expose is reachable from a compromised renderer.
- Keep the renderer's process isolation at its defaults rather than restoring them:
  `nodeIntegration: false`, `contextIsolation: true` and `sandbox: true` have been
  Electron's defaults for several major versions, so the finding is the line that
  **turns one off**. Note the coupling: under `sandbox: true` a preload gets a
  polyfilled module subset, so a preload needing `fs` fails — move that work behind