Menu

Individual skill

kernel-security

0upvotes

Use when writing an SELinux or AppArmor policy, a seccomp-bpf filter, enabling CET, PAC, or BTI, or triaging a kernel CVE. Not for KASAN report analysis: use kernel-debugging.

.devin/skills/kernel-security/SKILL.md

Read pinned source

Source commit b0e8ce89a19fac880251dc3ea1babfeb4503a4fe

What was checked

Matches the observed repository HEAD
Yes
Scanner rules are current
No
Repository scan complete
No
Skill scan complete
No
Observed behavior
Not checked yet
Last checked
Nov 4, 2026

These are observations at the recorded commit, not a guarantee of safety. Review the source before running it.

Install this skill

Choose an agent in your Stack or copy a command below. Commands fetch the pinned commit and copy only this skill directory. Existing destinations are refused. Copying a command does not install anything.

An install command is unavailable: current rules, complete repository and skill scans, an eligible behavior level and a permitted license are required.

Repository context

Repository stars (not skill ratings)
55
Repository last updated
Sep 28, 2026
License
Apache-2.0

Observed agent integration: No specific integration evidence. Standard SKILL.md installation does not imply verified compatibility.

Files and excerpt

File metadata and permitted, redacted excerpts come from the recorded scan. Source links are pinned to that commit.

Browse files
Read excerpt

# Kernel security

## Contract

| Field | Bound contract |
|---|---|
| Trigger | A user confines a service with SELinux or AppArmor, sandboxes a process with seccomp-bpf, hardens binaries with shadow stacks and branch protection, checks KASLR, builds a sanitizer kernel for vulnerability research, or asks whether a kernel CVE affects a given kernel and what mitigates it. |
| Authority | Human-gated: policy, profile, and filter sources are drafted into files the user names inside the project. Loading a policy module, switching a profile to enforce, changing a sysctl, or booting a new kernel changes the running system and needs explicit user confirmation per command; rollback is the recorded prior state (`semodule -r`, `aa-complain`, the previous sysctl value, the previous kernel). No remote mutation. |
| Side effect | Drafts are written and checked with the tool's own compiler or validator. System state changes only after confirmation. |
| Done | Each requested artifact compiles or validates, the confinement is proven by a denied access appearing in the audit log for a forbidden operation and no denial for the service's normal work, and each hardening claim is read back from the binary or the running kernel. |

## Inputs

1. The target (required): the service binary and its file, network, and syscall needs, or the binary to harden, or the kernel version (`uname -r`) and the CVE id.