Individual skill
web-oauth
Attack OAuth 2.0 / OIDC / SSO flows for account takeover. Load on "Login with Google/GitHub", /authorize, /callback, redirect_uri, state, code/token params, SAML/OIDC SSO. Signals: OAuth endpoints, redirect_uri handling, missing state, implicit flow, pre-account-linking.
skills/web/web-oauth/SKILL.md
Source commit ee0e0c50d2f6d941a14b73dd85a2b470d0ab976e
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- Matches the observed repository HEAD
- Yes
- Scanner rules are current
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- Repository scan complete
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- Skill scan complete
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- Observed behavior
- Not checked yet
- Last checked
- Nov 7, 2026
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Repository context
- Repository stars (not skill ratings)
- 27
- Repository last updated
- Oct 14, 2026
- License
- MIT
Observed agent integration: No specific integration evidence. Standard SKILL.md installation does not imply verified compatibility.
- agent-skills Repository topic
- ai-agents Repository topic
- ai-security Repository topic
- application-security Repository topic
- blue-team Repository topic
- bug-bounty Repository topic
- claude-code Repository topic
- codex Repository topic
- detection-engineering Repository topic
- gemini Repository topic
- engineering Derived category
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SKILL.mdcore · 2,246 bytes
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# OAuth / OIDC / SSO abuse
## When it applies
The app delegates auth via OAuth/OIDC (social login, enterprise SSO). Flaws here are frequently
full account takeover.
## Why it works
OAuth security depends on strict validation of `redirect_uri`, `state`, `code` binding, and how
identities are linked. Implementations relax one of these — and the token/code that proves
identity leaks to the attacker or an account gets linked to the wrong user.
## Method
1. **redirect_uri validation**: try appended paths, `//evil`, `@`, subdomain/suffix tricks,
open-redirect on an allowed host (→ `web-open-redirect`) to exfiltrate the `code`/`token`.