Individual skill
cloud-imds-ssrf
Escalate SSRF to cloud credential theft via the instance metadata service (IMDS). Load when SSRF is confirmed AND the target runs on AWS/GCP/Azure. Signals: 169.254.169.254 reachable, cloud-hosted app, SSRF that can set arbitrary Host/headers, "metadata".
skills/cloud/cloud-imds-ssrf/SKILL.md
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- Last checked
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- Oct 14, 2026
- License
- MIT
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- agent-skills Repository topic
- ai-agents Repository topic
- ai-security Repository topic
- application-security Repository topic
- blue-team Repository topic
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- engineering Derived category
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SKILL.mdcore · 2,496 bytesdetection.mddoc · 2,894 bytes
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# SSRF → cloud metadata → IAM credential theft
## When it applies
You have SSRF and the app runs on a cloud VM/container with an attached role. The metadata
endpoint hands out temporary credentials to anything that can reach it from the instance.
## Why it works
IMDS lives at a link-local IP (`169.254.169.254`) and trusts *network position*, not identity.
SSRF gives you that position, so the app fetches the instance's role credentials for you —
then you use them against the cloud API with the app's permissions.
## Method
1. **AWS IMDSv1** (no token): SSRF to
`http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/` → role name →