Individual skill

network-database-security

Assess reachable database services — PostgreSQL/MySQL/MSSQL/MongoDB/Redis — for unauthenticated access, weak/default accounts, over-broad grants, and dangerous features (xp_cmdshell, COPY FROM PROGRAM, UDF, Redis file write) that turn a DB login into OS code execution. Load when recon shows 3306/5432/1433/6379/27017, leaked app config yields DB creds, or a database review is in scope. Signals: 0.0.0.0 bind, unauth Redis PONG, mysql.user host '%', FILE priv, secure_file_priv empty, xp_cmdshell.

skills/network/network-database-security/SKILL.md

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Last checked
Nov 7, 2026

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27
Repository last updated
Oct 14, 2026
License
MIT

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# Database security assessment

## When it applies
An authorized engagement has a reachable database instance — surfaced by `network-service-attacks`,
handed over as a review target, or via app credentials recovered from a config dump. Covers
PostgreSQL, MySQL/MariaDB, MSSQL, MongoDB, and Redis. Before touching anything, confirm in
`scope.txt` (see `tradecraft-scope-roe`): which instances, which accounts, and **whether
write/delete/exec is permitted**. On production systems, default to read-only proofs — no
destructive statements unless explicitly allowed.

## Why it works
Databases concentrate the crown jewels yet are routinely deployed as "internal-only": bound to
`0.0.0.0`, default or weak accounts, grants far wider than the app needs, and dangerous features
left enabled. Features like `xp_cmdshell`, `COPY ... FROM PROGRAM`, UDFs, and Redis's writable
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