Individual skill
defense-network-detection
Detect attacker activity in network telemetry — C2 beaconing, DNS tunnelling, data exfil, and lateral movement. Load for "detect C2", "find beaconing", "network monitoring / NSM", "suspicious traffic", or building Zeek/Suricata coverage. The defensive counterpart to the offensive network/pivoting skills.
skills/defense/defense-network-detection/SKILL.md
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- Last checked
- Nov 7, 2026
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Repository context
- Repository stars (not skill ratings)
- 27
- Repository last updated
- Oct 14, 2026
- License
- MIT
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- agent-skills Repository topic
- ai-agents Repository topic
- ai-security Repository topic
- application-security Repository topic
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- gemini Repository topic
- data Derived category
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SKILL.mdcore · 2,506 bytes
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# Network detection (NSM)
## When it applies
You have network visibility (a tap/SPAN, Zeek/Suricata logs, or NetFlow) and want to catch activity
that endpoint tooling misses — especially C2 and exfil that look like ordinary connections.
## Why it works
Malware still has to talk. Even encrypted C2 leaks *behavioural* tells the payload can't hide:
regular call-home intervals, tiny requests with large responses, odd JA3/JA4 TLS fingerprints, and
destinations no user browses to. Metadata beats payload inspection in a TLS world.
## Method
1. **Beaconing**: hunt for connections at regular intervals with low jitter to the same destination
(RITA's beacon analysis over Zeek `conn.log`); score by consistency, not volume.