Individual skill

ad-delegation-abuse

Abuse Kerberos delegation to impersonate users and take over hosts — unconstrained, constrained (S4U2Self/S4U2Proxy), and resource-based (RBCD), including the coercion → NTLM-relay-to-LDAP → RBCD chain. Load in an AD environment when BloodHound/enum shows delegation rights, a machine account you control, GenericWrite/GenericAll over a computer, or coercion is possible. Signals: msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity, TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION, msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo, PetitPotam.

skills/ad/ad-delegation-abuse/SKILL.md

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Last checked: Nov 7, 2026

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Repository stars (not skill ratings): 27
Repository last updated: Oct 14, 2026
License: MIT

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# Kerberos delegation abuse

## When it applies
An AD engagement where enumeration (BloodHound, `nxc`, LDAP) shows a delegation primitive: a host
trusted for unconstrained delegation, an account with constrained delegation (`msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo`),
or — most commonly — write access over a computer object so you can set RBCD. Coercion + relay turns
"can authenticate a DC" into "control a DC". This is the modern lateral-movement/DA path.

## Why it works
Delegation lets a service act *on behalf of* a user. Kerberos implements it with S4U2Self (get a
ticket to yourself as any user) and S4U2Proxy (forward it to a target service). If you control an
account permitted to delegate — or can write `msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity` on a target
(RBCD) — you can mint a service ticket as *any* user, including Domain Admin, to that target.