Individual skill
code-review-cicd
Review CI/CD pipelines for security flaws — poisoned workflows, secret leakage, and injection. Load on GitHub Actions / GitLab CI / Jenkins config, ".github/workflows", pull_request_target, self-hosted runners, or "pipeline security". Signals: workflow YAML, secrets in CI, third-party actions.
skills/code-review/code-review-cicd/SKILL.md
Source commit ee0e0c50d2f6d941a14b73dd85a2b470d0ab976e
What was checked
- Matches the observed repository HEAD
- Yes
- Scanner rules are current
- No
- Repository scan complete
- No
- Skill scan complete
- Yes
- Observed behavior
- Not checked yet
- Last checked
- Nov 7, 2026
These are observations at the recorded commit, not a guarantee of safety. Review the source before running it.
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Repository context
- Repository stars (not skill ratings)
- 27
- Repository last updated
- Oct 14, 2026
- License
- MIT
Observed agent integration: No specific integration evidence. Standard SKILL.md installation does not imply verified compatibility.
- agent-skills Repository topic
- ai-agents Repository topic
- ai-security Repository topic
- application-security Repository topic
- blue-team Repository topic
- bug-bounty Repository topic
- claude-code Repository topic
- codex Repository topic
- detection-engineering Repository topic
- gemini Repository topic
- operations Derived category
- devops Derived category
- security Derived category
Files and excerpt
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SKILL.mdcore · 2,621 bytes
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# CI/CD pipeline security review
## When it applies
You can read a repo's CI config (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkinsfile, CircleCI). Pipelines run
with secrets and often on attacker-influenced input (PRs), making them a high-value, under-reviewed target.
## Why it works
CI runs code with privileged tokens/secrets. Misconfigurations let a fork PR run in a trusted
context, inject commands via untrusted inputs, or exfiltrate secrets — a supply-chain foothold. On
public repos this can be exploitable by anyone who opens a PR.
## Method
1. **Dangerous triggers**: `pull_request_target` / `workflow_run` that check out and run **PR code**
with secrets in scope → fork PRs can steal secrets or run arbitrary code (the classic GitHub Actions bug).