Individual skill
web-idor
Insecure Direct Object Reference / broken access control on web objects. Load when a request references an object by id you can change: /account/1234, ?invoice=987, UUIDs in URLs/bodies, "download", "view", "edit" endpoints, numeric or guessable identifiers, or multi-tenant apps. Signals: sequential IDs, object refs in JSON, role/owner not re-checked.
skills/web/web-idor/SKILL.md
Source commit ee0e0c50d2f6d941a14b73dd85a2b470d0ab976e
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- Yes
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- Observed behavior
- Not checked yet
- Last checked
- Nov 7, 2026
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Repository context
- Repository stars (not skill ratings)
- 27
- Repository last updated
- Oct 14, 2026
- License
- MIT
Observed agent integration: No specific integration evidence. Standard SKILL.md installation does not imply verified compatibility.
- agent-skills Repository topic
- ai-agents Repository topic
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- engineering Derived category
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SKILL.mdcore · 2,477 bytesdetection.mddoc · 2,580 bytes
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# Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)
## When it applies
The app trusts a client-supplied identifier to decide which object to return or mutate, and
authorization is checked at the *route* ("is logged in?") but not at the *object* ("does THIS
user own THIS object?").
## Why it works
Access control is missing at the data layer. The server maps id → row and returns it without
asking whether the current session is allowed that row. Sequential/predictable ids make
enumeration trivial; even UUIDs leak (in listings, referrers, other endpoints).
## Method
1. **Get two accounts** (A = attacker, B = victim). Do an action as B, capture the request,