Individual skill

api-graphql

Attack GraphQL APIs. Load on /graphql, /graphiql, /v1/graphql, a POST with {"query":"..."}, Apollo/Hasura/graphene stacks, or "query/mutation" language. Signals: introspection enabled, batched queries, deeply nested fields, __schema, aliases.

skills/api/api-graphql/SKILL.md

Read pinned source

Source commit ee0e0c50d2f6d941a14b73dd85a2b470d0ab976e

What was checked

Matches the observed repository HEAD: Yes
Scanner rules are current: Yes
Repository scan complete: No
Skill scan complete: Yes
Observed behavior: Instructions only
Last checked: Nov 11, 2026

These are observations at the recorded commit, not a guarantee of safety. Review the source before running it.

Install this skill

Choose an agent in your Stack or copy a command below. Commands fetch the pinned commit and copy only this skill directory. Existing destinations are refused. Copying a command does not install anything.

An install command is unavailable: current rules, complete repository and skill scans, an eligible behavior level and a permitted license are required.

Repository context

Repository stars (not skill ratings): 27
Repository last updated: Oct 14, 2026
License: MIT

Observed agent integration: No specific integration evidence. Standard SKILL.md installation does not imply verified compatibility.

agent-skills Repository topic
ai-agents Repository topic
ai-security Repository topic
application-security Repository topic
blue-team Repository topic
bug-bounty Repository topic
claude-code Repository topic
codex Repository topic
detection-engineering Repository topic
gemini Repository topic
engineering Derived category

Files and excerpt

File metadata and permitted, redacted excerpts come from the recorded scan. Source links are pinned to that commit.

Browse files

SKILL.mdcore · 2,368 bytes
detection.mddoc · 2,906 bytes

Read excerpt


# GraphQL abuse

## When it applies
The target exposes a GraphQL endpoint. GraphQL collapses many objects behind one URL, so
authorization gaps and info leaks are common and easy to miss with URL-based testing.

## Why it works
One endpoint, a self-describing schema, and per-field resolvers mean access control must be
enforced at every field/resolver — it frequently isn't. Introspection hands you the entire
attack surface; batching/aliases turn one request into thousands.

## Method
1. **Fingerprint & map**: `graphw00f` for the engine; if introspection is on, dump the schema
   (`{__schema{types{name fields{name}}}}`) with `inql`/`clairvoyance`. If off, brute field