Individual skill
web-ssrf
Discover and escalate Server-Side Request Forgery. Load when the app fetches a URL you influence: webhooks, "import from URL", link/image preview, PDF/HTML render, avatar-by-URL, URL health-checks, XML/SVG parsers. Signals: params like url=, uri=, dest=, callback=, image=, feed=, or a request that reaches out on your behalf.
skills/web/web-ssrf/SKILL.md
Source commit ee0e0c50d2f6d941a14b73dd85a2b470d0ab976e
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- Last checked
- Nov 7, 2026
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- Repository last updated
- Oct 14, 2026
- License
- MIT
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- agent-skills Repository topic
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- engineering Derived category
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SKILL.mdcore · 2,496 bytesdetection.mddoc · 2,829 bytes
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# Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
## When it applies
The server makes an outbound request to a destination you control or influence. Even a
"blind" fetch (no response shown) is useful if you can see the callback and reach internal
services.
## Why it works
The request originates from inside the trust boundary, so it bypasses network ACLs and hits
things you can't reach directly: cloud metadata, internal admin panels, databases, other
microservices — often unauthenticated because they "only accept internal traffic".
## Method
1. **Confirm** with an out-of-band beacon: point the param at your `interactsh`/Collaborator