Individual skill
defense-cloud-detection
Detect and respond to attacks in cloud control planes — credential abuse, IMDS theft, persistence, and privilege escalation — from audit logs. Load for "detect cloud attacks", "CloudTrail/GuardDuty", "someone used our keys", AWS/Azure/GCP monitoring, or cloud IR. The defensive counterpart to the cloud-* offensive skills.
skills/defense/defense-cloud-detection/SKILL.md
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- Last checked
- Nov 11, 2026
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- Repository last updated
- Oct 14, 2026
- License
- MIT
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- security Derived category
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# Cloud detection & response
## When it applies
Your assets live in AWS/Azure/GCP and you need to catch control-plane abuse — stolen keys, a role
assumed from a strange place, new persistence — using the provider's audit logs.
## Why it works
Every cloud API call is logged (CloudTrail / Azure Activity / GCP Admin Activity). Attacks that are
invisible on the host (assuming a role, reading a secret, adding a key) are loud in the control
plane — if you're actually reading it. The identity *and* the calling context are in every event.
## Method
1. **Guarantee the telemetry**: CloudTrail (all regions + management & data events), Azure Activity
+ Entra sign-in logs, GCP audit logs — centralised and immutable. No logs → no detection.