Individual skill
defense-threat-modeling
Threat-model a system or feature (STRIDE + attack trees) to find design-level risk before code. Load on "threat model", a new design/architecture review, security design questions, or planning controls. Signals: architecture diagram, data-flow, "what could go wrong", pre-build security.
skills/defense/defense-threat-modeling/SKILL.md
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# Threat modeling (STRIDE + attack trees)
## When it applies
Before or during design — a new feature, service, or architecture — to find what can go wrong at
the design level, where fixes are cheapest. Pairs offense knowledge with a structured method.
## Why it works
Most breaches exploit design gaps, not just code bugs. Systematically walking each component and
data flow against a threat taxonomy surfaces missing controls (authz, validation, isolation) that
ad-hoc review misses, and produces a prioritized list of controls and tests.
## Method
1. **Model the system**: draw the data-flow diagram — external entities, processes, data stores,
and trust boundaries (where data crosses privilege levels). The boundaries are where threats concentrate.