Individual skill
code-review-dotnet
Security review of .NET / C# code — dangerous sinks and ASP.NET pitfalls. Load when reviewing a C#/.NET codebase/PR, on .cs source in scope, or "review this .NET app". Signals: .csproj/.sln, ASP.NET (Core/MVC/WebForms), BinaryFormatter, SqlCommand, Razor Html.Raw, XmlDocument.
skills/code-review/code-review-dotnet/SKILL.md
Source commit ee0e0c50d2f6d941a14b73dd85a2b470d0ab976e
What was checked
- Matches the observed repository HEAD
- Yes
- Scanner rules are current
- No
- Repository scan complete
- No
- Skill scan complete
- No
- Observed behavior
- Not checked yet
- Last checked
- Nov 7, 2026
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Repository context
- Repository stars (not skill ratings)
- 27
- Repository last updated
- Oct 14, 2026
- License
- MIT
Observed agent integration: No specific integration evidence. Standard SKILL.md installation does not imply verified compatibility.
- agent-skills Repository topic
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- claude-code Repository topic
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- security Derived category
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# .NET / C# source review
## When it applies
Reviewing C#/.NET source (ASP.NET Core, MVC, or legacy WebForms). The headline risks are unsafe
deserialization, string-built SQL, XXE, and Razor's raw-output escape hatch.
## Why it works
.NET ships powerful-but-dangerous serializers (`BinaryFormatter`, `Json.NET` with
`TypeNameHandling`, `LosFormatter`/ViewState) that instantiate arbitrary types, and several XML APIs
resolve DTDs by default on older frameworks. Reviews find where these meet untrusted input.
## Sinks & patterns (grep, then trace to user input)
- **Deserialization**: `BinaryFormatter`, `LosFormatter`, `SoapFormatter`, `NetDataContractSerializer`,
`JsonConvert` with `TypeNameHandling != None`, `Js.NET`/`fastJSON` polymorphic types → RCE gadgets.