Individual skill

mobile-deeplink-abuse

Abuse deep links / custom URL schemes / intents for redirect, token theft, and reaching internal screens. Load on custom schemes (myapp://), App Links/Universal Links, exported activities, or "open in app". Signals: intent-filters in the manifest, WebView loading deep-link params, OAuth redirect via a custom scheme.

skills/mobile/mobile-deeplink-abuse/SKILL.md

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Observed behavior: Instructions only
Last checked: Nov 11, 2026

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Repository stars (not skill ratings): 27
Repository last updated: Oct 14, 2026
License: MIT

Observed agent integration: No specific integration evidence. Standard SKILL.md installation does not imply verified compatibility.

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# Deep link / URL scheme / intent abuse

## When it applies
The app registers custom URL schemes or App/Universal Links, or exports activities that accept
data. A malicious link (in a web page, another app, or a QR) can then drive the app.

## Why it works
Deep-link handlers receive attacker-controlled data and often trust it: they redirect, load it
into a WebView, pass it to auth flows, or open privileged screens without re-checking who sent
the intent. Custom schemes aren't verified for ownership (unlike App Links), so any app can claim them.

## Method
1. **Map handlers**: from the manifest, list `intent-filter` schemes/hosts and exported
   activities; read `jadx` for how each parameter is used.