Individual skill
cloud-docker-api-abuse
Turn an exposed container daemon or an over-privileged container into host compromise — a Docker API on 2375/2376, a mounted docker.sock, or a privileged/`-v /:/host` container. Load when you find an open Docker/containerd socket, port 2375/2376, a container you can run images in, or you landed inside a container and want the host. Signals: 2375/tcp open, /var/run/docker.sock reachable, `docker` group membership, privileged container, host paths mounted in.
skills/cloud/cloud-docker-api-abuse/SKILL.md
Source commit ee0e0c50d2f6d941a14b73dd85a2b470d0ab976e
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- Observed behavior
- Network or broad shell
- Last checked
- Nov 11, 2026
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- 27
- Repository last updated
- Oct 14, 2026
- License
- MIT
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SKILL.mdcore · 3,700 bytes
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# Docker / container daemon abuse
## When it applies
You can reach a container control plane you shouldn't: an unauthenticated Docker API on `2375/tcp`
(or `2376` without client-cert auth), a mounted `/var/run/docker.sock` inside a container you
control, membership in the `docker` group, or a privileged/host-mounted container. Any of these is
effectively root on the host. Complements `cloud-container-escape` (which focuses on kernel/runtime
breakouts); this one is about the daemon/socket as the vector.
## Why it works
The Docker daemon runs as root and will build/run any container with any mount you ask for. Anyone
who can talk to its API or socket can start a container that bind-mounts the host filesystem
(`-v /:/host`) or runs `--privileged` — then read/write host files, add a root user, or chroot in.
There's no privilege boundary between "can use the daemon" and "root on the host".