Individual skill
cloud-gcp
Attack Google Cloud Platform — metadata/SA token theft, IAM privilege escalation, and storage/ function misconfig. Load when the target runs on GCP, you hold a GCP SA key/token, or see gcp/gcloud/GCE/GKE/appspot. Signals: metadata.google.internal, service-account.json, storage.googleapis.com, cloudfunctions, gcloud.
skills/cloud/cloud-gcp/SKILL.md
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# GCP attacks
## When it applies
The target is on GCP and you have some access — an SSRF into a GCE/GKE instance, a leaked service
account (SA) key, or a foothold in a workload. Goal: steal credentials, escalate IAM, reach data.
## Why it works
GCP identity centers on **service accounts** and IAM bindings that are frequently over-granted. The
metadata server hands SA tokens to anything on the instance, and a small set of permissions
(`actAs`, `setIamPolicy`, deploy roles) form known escalation paths to owner.
## Method
1. **Metadata → SA token** (via SSRF, or on the host): `GET metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/
instance/service-accounts/default/token` with header `Metadata-Flavor: Google` (→ `cloud-imds-ssrf`).