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detecting-entra-offensive-tools-in-graph-logs

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Hunt AADGraphActivityLogs and MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs in Microsoft Sentinel/Log Analytics using KQL to fingerprint offensive Entra ID enumeration tools such as ROADtools, AADInternals, and AzureHound, including User-Agent signatures, roadrecon endpoint sweeps, and sign-in correlation. Use when investigating suspicious Microsoft Graph API activity, Entra ID reconnaissance, or building Sentinel analytics rules to detect these tools.

skills/detecting-entra-offensive-tools-in-graph-logs/SKILL.md

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# Detecting Entra Offensive Tools in Graph Logs

## Overview

For nearly a decade the legacy **Azure AD Graph API** (`graph.windows.net`) was a defender blind spot: requests to it produced no first-class activity log, so tools like ROADtools (`roadrecon`) and AADInternals — which lean heavily on AAD Graph — could enumerate an entire tenant with little trace. That changed when Microsoft shipped **AADGraphActivityLogs** (general availability in 2026), the counterpart to the already-available **MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs** (`graph.microsoft.com`). Together these two tables give SOCs request-level visibility into directory API traffic: the caller identity, app, source IP, HTTP method, request URI, and crucially the **User-Agent**.

This skill is the defensive complement to offensive Entra tooling. It hunts the two Graph activity tables for the behavioral and string fingerprints those tools leave behind. Many operators forget to spoof the User-Agent, so ROADtools (built on Python's `aiohttp`) emits a User-Agent like `Python/3.12 aiohttp/3.10.4`, and AADInternals frequently leaves `AADInternals` or library strings in the agent. Even when the agent is spoofed, the tools betray themselves through a characteristic **endpoint-sweep pattern**: `roadrecon gather` pulls `users`, `groups`, `applications`, `serviceprincipals`, `devices`, `directoryroles`, `roledefinitions`, `oauth2permissiongrants`, and more within a tight time window — a signature that survives header spoofing.

The activity being detected maps to MITRE ATT&CK **T1078.004 – Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts**: an adversary using legitimate (often phished or token-stolen) cloud credentials to enumerate and operate against the tenant via the Graph APIs. These detections both surface live intrusions and validate that the offensive techniques in the companion red-team skills are observable.

## When to Use

- Building or tuning detections for Microsoft Sentinel / Log Analytics covering Entra ID
- Threat hunting after suspected credential theft, device-code phishing, or OAuth consent abuse
- Purple-team exercises validating that ROADtools/AADInternals/AzureHound activity is detectable
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